The Ganges water treaty after 2026: water, power politics and Bangladesh's struggle to survive

The future of the Ganges water-sharing treaty after 2026 is set to become one of the most important, sensitive and strategically complex issues in contemporary South Asian geopolitics. Signed between Bangladesh and India in 1996, the treaty will expire in December 2026, opening a new and potentially unstable chapter in transboundary water politics. The transition comes as climate change, growing geopolitical competition and domestic political realignments in both countries are rapidly reshaping the regional environment.

The treaty, once viewed as a comparatively stable framework for sharing dry-season water at the Farakka Barrage, is no longer simply a matter of water allocation. It is increasingly becoming a high-stakes diplomatic and strategic question involving environmental stability, agricultural survival, regional influence, environmental security and national sovereignty.

Hydrological and policy research estimates that around 30 to 40 million people in Bangladesh, particularly in the country's southwest, depend directly or indirectly on the Ganges river system for agriculture, fisheries, drinking water, navigation and ecological balance.

For Bangladesh, the future of the treaty is therefore not merely a technical question of river flow. It is directly connected to food security, climate resilience, rural livelihoods, environmental stability and the long-term survival of millions of people living in the country's southwest. Whether Bangladesh can secure a fair and climate-sensitive water-sharing framework after 2026 will depend significantly on the diplomatic capacity of the current government. Otherwise, water insecurity and environmental pressure could intensify in one of the world's most climate-vulnerable countries.

The Farakka question and a changing river system

The central issue of the Ganges treaty is dry-season water allocation at the Farakka point. India diverts water upstream to maintain the navigability of the Kolkata port. The 1996 treaty sought to ensure a minimum flow for Bangladesh during the critical period from January to May while also addressing India's upstream requirements.

For almost three decades, despite periodic tensions, the treaty has played an important role in bilateral relations. For Bangladesh, however, it has often been viewed as a case of making the best of a difficult situation. The reality of 2026 is markedly different from that of 1996.

Climate change has significantly altered flow patterns across the Ganges basin. Irregular monsoon rainfall, upstream water-withdrawal projects, changes in glaciers, abnormal precipitation and rising temperatures are making river flows increasingly uncertain.

At the same time, population growth and rising agricultural demand in both countries have placed much greater pressure on freshwater resources than existed in 1996. The assumption behind the original treaty—that river flows would remain relatively stable—is increasingly unsupported by current conditions.

For Bangladesh, declining dry-season flows can have severe consequences. Large areas of Khulna, Satkhira and Jashore in the southwest depend on Ganges water for irrigation, fisheries, drinking water and ecological stability.

Reduced freshwater flows are allowing saline water from the Bay of Bengal to move further inland, threatening agricultural production and food security. River navigability is declining, groundwater recharge is being disrupted and freshwater shortages are becoming increasingly severe in rural areas.

The environmental changes also carry social and economic consequences. Declining agricultural production can increase rural poverty and unemployment, forcing people to migrate internally to major cities such as Dhaka and Chattogram in search of livelihoods.

Climate experts have long warned that further reductions in upstream dry-season flows could increase climate-induced migration in the coming decades. The future of the Ganges treaty is therefore closely connected to Bangladesh's broader strategy for climate resilience.

Politics, diplomacy and changing bilateral relations

The renegotiation process is not taking place in a stable political environment. Bangladesh and India have undergone significant political changes in recent years.

In Bangladesh, prolonged political instability and economic discontent were followed by the end of Sheikh Hasina's long rule. An interim government led by Muhammad Yunus subsequently oversaw a period of transition, before the February 2026 election brought the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, led by Tarique Rahman, to power.

This political change has affected Bangladesh's foreign-policy approach, particularly its relations with India. Opposition to India among religious political groups, calls for a foreign policy oriented more towards the United States or China while bypassing India, and India's decision to provide shelter to former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who was removed from power during the 2024 mass uprising, are all affecting Bangladesh-India relations.

During the previous Awami League government, Bangladesh-India relations depended substantially on high-level political coordination and comparatively stable diplomatic understandings. The new government has indicated a firmer, more national-interest-centred foreign policy.

Senior BNP leaders have already spoken of the need to reconsider various existing bilateral agreements to ensure Bangladesh's strategic interests and fair benefits.

This shift will directly affect water diplomacy. Where water negotiations previously advanced in many cases through high-level political understandings, the post-2026 environment could become more public, politically sensitive and interest-driven. Water allocation could also become a major national issue within Bangladesh's domestic politics.

India's internal political dynamics will also matter. Although final authority over the treaty rests with the central government in New Delhi, West Bengal remains important because of its direct geographic and political connection to the Farakka Barrage.

The rise of a BJP-backed government in West Bengal could strengthen coordination between the state and central governments on water policy. Former West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee was widely viewed as an obstacle to water agreements with Bangladesh.

Differences between the West Bengal government and the central government have previously complicated transboundary water negotiations, including the Teesta issue. Greater political coordination could make India's position more consolidated. At the same time, rising water demand in eastern India driven by agriculture, urbanisation and industrial expansion could push India towards a harder position on securing upstream water.

This creates a complex diplomatic reality for Bangladesh. India wants greater flexibility in upstream water use, while Bangladesh seeks guaranteed downstream flows. The central challenge after 2026 will therefore be balancing India's growing domestic pressures with Bangladesh's increasing climate vulnerability.

Water diplomacy in a wider geopolitical contest

The future of the Ganges treaty is also closely connected to broader geopolitical realities. Water diplomacy can no longer be viewed solely through the question of river flows. It is increasingly part of the wider strategic competition involving China, the United States and India.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China has significantly expanded infrastructure, energy, transport and industrial investment in Bangladesh. Although the Ganges treaty remains a bilateral issue between Bangladesh and India, China's growing influence in South Asia affects the strategic environment surrounding the negotiations.

Bangladesh is also seeking Chinese cooperation in river restoration, water management and infrastructure development. While this does not necessarily signal a shift in Bangladesh's geopolitical alignment, it could increase the country's bargaining capacity. India, meanwhile, views China's growing presence in South Asia as highly sensitive from a strategic perspective.

At the same time, US engagement in South Asia has increased through its Indo-Pacific Strategy. Bangladesh's growing importance to global production and maritime connectivity has added another dimension to its geopolitical position.

Bangladesh therefore finds itself in a strategic environment where it must simultaneously manage relations with India, China and the United States.

This wider geopolitical reality will influence water diplomacy. The Ganges treaty is no longer simply about the allocation of river water; it has become part of a broader discussion about regional influence, connectivity, climate resilience and strategic positioning.

What a post-2026 framework could require

Both countries understand that allowing the treaty to become completely ineffective would be strategically harmful to both sides. Joint technical monitoring and water-flow assessment have already begun before the treaty's expiry, indicating that institutional cooperation between the two countries continues.

However, many experts believe that simply renewing the 1996 framework will not be sufficient.

The treaty was negotiated in a fundamentally different era. Current conditions demand a framework that is more adaptive, science-based and climate-sensitive.

Bangladesh's most important priority should be to secure a legally binding minimum dry-season flow. One weakness of the existing treaty is that it does not effectively establish an enforceable environmental minimum flow, leading Bangladesh to repeatedly complain about inadequate water during low-flow years.

A new agreement should prioritise ecological stability alongside water quantity. Stable flows are essential to agriculture, biodiversity, fisheries and freshwater ecosystems in the southwest.

Climate change must also be incorporated into the allocation framework. Fixed historical quotas may no longer be sufficient under changing hydrological conditions.

The future treaty should include:

Real-time river-flow monitoring

Climate forecasting

Seasonal coordination

Transparent data sharing

A stronger mechanism for dispute resolution

Long-term basin-wide water management

The existing agreement primarily addresses water allocation at Farakka and establishes limited joint institutional mechanisms, including the Joint Committee and Joint Rivers Commission. It does not create a permanent basin-wide governance body or an integrated river-basin management framework.

Bangladesh should therefore seek a permanent joint structure for Ganges basin management. A jointly represented Ganges Basin Commission could play an important role in monitoring implementation, resolving disputes, managing the environment and ensuring transparency of information.

Bangladesh should also connect the treaty to the broader issue of climate justice. The country's contribution to global greenhouse-gas emissions is very small, yet it faces a disproportionate share of climate-related impacts.

Freshwater scarcity, rising salinity and climate-induced displacement are not merely environmental problems; they also reflect wider global inequality.

A test for regional cooperation

The future of the Ganges water treaty after 2026 is not simply a bilateral diplomatic negotiation. It will be a major test for Bangladesh-India relations and an indication of how effectively regional diplomacy can adapt to climate change, political transformation and geopolitical competition.

For Bangladesh, the treaty is not merely about water. It is about protecting agricultural stability, preventing environmental degradation, reducing climate migration and maintaining national resilience in an increasingly vulnerable environment.

A successful new agreement could become a model of climate-resilient transboundary cooperation for countries across the Global South. But a failed negotiation or weak agreement could extend its consequences beyond diplomacy, deepening water insecurity, environmental degradation and regional mistrust.

Historically, the Ganges has connected the civilisation, economy and culture of the subcontinent. After 2026, the central question for Bangladesh and India will be whether this shared river remains a bridge for cooperation or increasingly becomes a dividing line of crisis and strategic competition.