Trump’s twin 15-point frameworks and the emerging architecture of a new Middle Eastern security order

One framework was presented to Iran in March as a proposed way to end the war. The other, developed under Trump’s Board of Peace for Gaza, seeks to establish a new security and governing arrangement in the territory. Although the conflicts are different, the two initiatives rely on a strikingly similar bargaining logic: reduce the military capabilities of an adversary, replace them with externally backed security arrangements, and offer political or economic benefits in return.

The reported US proposal to Iran included the removal of enriched uranium, an end to uranium enrichment, restrictions on Iran’s ballistic-missile programme and an end to support for regional armed groups. In exchange, Washington offered extensive sanctions relief. The proposal also addressed maritime security and freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Gaza framework is more directly concerned with governance and territorial security. Its 15-point roadmap envisages Palestinian civilian administration, phased disarmament, international verification, an international stabilisation force, Israeli military withdrawal and reconstruction.

One logic, two theatres

The Iran and Gaza proposals cannot be treated as identical peace plans. Iran is a sovereign state with a regional military network, while Gaza involves a territory, a non-state armed organisation and an Israeli military presence.

Yet their underlying architecture is comparable.

In both cases, Washington is attempting to transform the conditions that make continued conflict possible rather than simply negotiate a temporary ceasefire.

The common objective is not merely to stop fighting, but to change who possesses coercive power after the fighting stops.

In Iran, that means restricting nuclear, missile and proxy capabilities.

In Gaza, it means transferring security authority away from Hamas and establishing alternative Palestinian and international institutions.

This is a classic problem of order-building: peace depends not only on ending violence but on constructing a political and security system capable of preventing its return.

The security dilemma at the centre

The strongest theoretical connection between the two plans is the security dilemma.

Iran regards strategic capabilities such as missiles and nuclear infrastructure as instruments of deterrence against external attack. Washington, however, views those same capabilities as potential threats to US forces, Israel and regional allies.

Gaza presents a similar problem at a different level. Israel sees Hamas's weapons as a continuing security threat, while Hamas has historically treated its military capability as a source of deterrence and political leverage.

This produces a fundamental contradiction.

If an actor gives up its weapons before receiving credible guarantees, it becomes more vulnerable. But if it refuses to surrender those weapons, the opposing side has little incentive to provide the guarantees.

The result is a cycle in which the measures one side considers necessary for peace are interpreted by the other as threats to its security.

The problem of who moves first

The most difficult issue in both frameworks is therefore sequencing.

For Iran, the central question is whether Tehran should surrender major elements of its strategic capability before it can be certain that sanctions relief and security guarantees will endure.

For Gaza, the question is even more immediate. Israel insists that Hamas must be genuinely disarmed before Israeli forces withdraw, while the US-backed roadmap envisages disarmament and withdrawal as interconnected stages. On Aug. 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly rejected the 15-point document and said Israeli forces would not withdraw until Hamas was disarmed.

The problem can be reduced to a simple bargaining dilemma:

Disarmament → withdrawal

or

withdrawal ↔ disarmament

The first sequence creates vulnerability for whoever moves first. The second requires reciprocal implementation and credible monitoring.

That distinction could determine whether the Gaza framework survives.

Coercion and incentives

Trump's approach also reflects the logic of coercive diplomacy.

Rather than relying exclusively on persuasion, the strategy combines pressure with incentives. The Iranian proposal reportedly paired demands for major strategic concessions with sanctions relief.

The Gaza framework similarly connects disarmament with Israeli withdrawal, international stabilisation and reconstruction.

The message is essentially transactional:

give up strategic leverage, receive security and economic benefits.

This is consistent with Trump's broader preference for negotiated bargains in which political objectives are translated into concrete exchanges.

But transactional diplomacy has a weakness. It assumes that the parties value the proposed rewards more highly than the strategic capabilities they are being asked to surrender.

That assumption is not always valid.

From conflict management to regional restructuring

The significance of the two frameworks becomes clearer when viewed through Regional Security Complex Theory, which argues that security problems in geographically connected regions cannot be understood independently.

Iran's influence extends across several interconnected arenas, including the Gulf, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. Gaza is similarly connected to the wider confrontation involving Israel, Iran and regional armed groups.

The Strait of Hormuz adds another layer because a regional security crisis can rapidly become a global economic crisis.

The reported Iran proposal therefore went beyond Tehran's nuclear programme. By addressing missiles, regional armed groups and maritime navigation, Washington was attempting to alter several interconnected elements of the regional security system at once.

The Gaza framework follows a comparable logic by attempting to connect disarmament, governance, international security and reconstruction.

The emerging American bargain

Taken together, the two plans suggest an emerging US approach to Middle Eastern diplomacy based on four linked elements:

Disarmament: reduce the military capabilities that sustain conflict.

External security: replace unilateral military power with international or US-backed guarantees.

Political restructuring: establish new governing arrangements after conflict.

Economic incentives: use sanctions relief, reconstruction and investment to make the new order sustainable.

This is more ambitious than traditional ceasefire diplomacy.

A ceasefire attempts to stop violence.

These frameworks attempt to change the structure that produces violence.

That distinction explains both their potential and their difficulties.

A regional order built on reciprocity

The central challenge for Washington is credibility.

Iran must believe that surrendering enrichment capabilities and reducing its regional military leverage will produce durable sanctions relief and security.

Israel must believe that Hamas's disarmament will be genuine and irreversible.

Hamas, meanwhile, must believe that surrendering its weapons will actually be followed by Israeli withdrawal and a meaningful political transition.

Each side therefore demands evidence that the other will honour its part of the bargain.

This is the classic credible-commitment problem in international relations.

A peace agreement can be mutually beneficial and still fail if the parties believe that cooperation today will leave them vulnerable tomorrow.

Why Gaza matters for the Iran negotiations

The rejection of the Gaza plan by Netanyahu could also have consequences beyond Gaza.

The Trump administration is simultaneously trying to shape the post-war environment involving Iran and the wider Gulf. A failure to produce a workable settlement in Gaza would demonstrate the limits of Washington's ability to impose sequencing on even its closest regional partner.

That matters for negotiations with Tehran.

Iran has strong incentives to ask a simple question: if Washington cannot guarantee implementation of an agreement with Israel, why should Tehran trust American guarantees on sanctions, military pressure or regional security?

In that sense, Gaza and Iran are not isolated diplomatic files.

They are tests of the same underlying proposition: whether American power can convert battlefield leverage into a stable negotiated order.

The paradox of Trump's strategy

The paradox is that the more comprehensive the plans become, the more difficult they are to implement.

Linking nuclear restrictions to sanctions relief creates bargaining opportunities, but it also means that disagreement over one issue can threaten the entire settlement.

Linking Hamas disarmament to Israeli withdrawal and reconstruction creates a pathway toward peace, but it also creates multiple points of potential failure.

Trump's two 15-point frameworks therefore represent an ambitious attempt to transform Middle Eastern conflicts through coercion, reciprocity and institutional redesign.

Their success will ultimately depend less on the number of provisions than on whether the parties believe the new order will leave them sufficiently secure.

The fundamental question facing both Iran and Gaza is consequently the same:

Can the parties accept less military leverage today because they trust the political and security guarantees they are promised tomorrow?

If the answer is no, the 15-point frameworks may remain bargaining documents rather than peace settlements.

If the answer becomes yes, the two initiatives could mark something more significant: an attempt by Washington to move from managing Middle Eastern conflicts to restructuring the regional order that sustains them.